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ARGUMENT
AN INTERVENING DECISION THAT ALTERS T H E EXISTING
SITUATION IN A CASE PRECLUDES T H E APPLICATION OF
T H E PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA AS A BAR TO T H E LATER
CASE.
A. Legal principles governing this case have significantly changed
between the time the 1996 case was decided and the time the 1998
case was decided.
Even if this Court were to agree with Sandy City's argument that the issues
litigated in the 1998 case are identical to the issues litigated in the 1996 case, the law
in Utah is well settled that the Court must make the two additional inquiries set forth
in Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Company, 596 P. 2d 1028, 1032 (Utah 1979)
before applying the principles of collateral estoppel:
1. Whether the controlling facts or legal principles have changed
significantly since the prior judgment.
2. Whether other special circumstances warrant an exception to the
normal rules of preclusion.
In the instant case, the legal principles governing the litigation changed
significantly between the 1996 case and the 1998 case when this Court decided Brown,
et al vs. Sandy City Board ofAdjustment; and Sandy, a political subdivision of Utah, 957 P. 2d
207 (Utah App. 1998). Sandy City argues that this is not the type of "change" that
would warrant disregarding the general rules of res judicata. It is, however, difficult
to imagine a change in controlling legal principles that would be more applicable than
in this case. Brown, supra, involved the precise issue of whether Sandy City's zoning
ordinances could or should be interpreted to prohibit short-term rentals within Sandy
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City. The "legal principles" applied in the petitioners' 1996 case prompted a ruling by
the District Court that the ordinances could be interpreted to prohibit such use. The
ruling in Brown, i.e., that the Sandy City ordinances then in effect did not prohibit
such use, changed the legal principles to be applied in interpreting the relevant Sandy
City zoning ordinances. Based upon that change in controlling legal principles, the
petitioners in this case had the right to petition the court for non-conforming use
status with respect to their properties located in Sandy City. This appeal should not
therefore be barred by collateral estoppel.
B. The federal cases cited by the Appellee are not controlling in
this case.
Sandy City cites a number of federal case authorities in its brief to support its
argument that principles of res judicata should bar the Petitioners' appeal in this case.
While those authorities are persuasive in the federal arena in cases involving federal
questions, they are not controlling in this case where no federal questions or federal
jurisdictional issues are presented for review. In any event, the inquiry set forth in
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Yjoan Company, supra, would still be required to be
made and would, as argued above, result in the conclusion that principles of res
judicata should not operate as a bar in this case.
The general rule enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1945), i.e., that res judicata is no defense where
between the time of the first judgment and the second there has been an intervening
decision or a change in the law creating an altered situation, has not been overruled
by Federated Dept. Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), as suggested by Sandy City.
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(Federated Dept. Stores v. Moitie, supra, held that accepted principles of res judicata
determine the preclusive effect of a federal court judgment. 452 U.S. at 401. ) In
fact, in the case of Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court,
citing Federated Dept. Stores v. Moitie, supra, stated that "[Judgments] are subject to the
general principles of finality and repose, absent changed circumstances or unforeseen issues not
previously litigated" [emphasis added] Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619(1983)
II.

IT SHOULD BE PRESUMED THAT T H E PROPERTY OWNERS
WERE USING THEIR PROPERTIES AS SHORT-TERM RENTALS
AT T H E TIME OF T H E CEASE A N D DESIST ORDER.
In this case, where Sandy City issued its Cease and Desist Order (R. 28)

demanding that Mr. and Mrs. Collins cease using their real properties located in
Sandy City as short-term rentals, it can logically, and should in fairness, be presumed
by this Court that in fact the Petitioners were using their properties for that purpose
prior to the issuance of the Cease and Desist Order. Mr. and Mrs. Collins never at
any time denied that this was the use being made of the properties owned by them.
In fact, evidence was introduced at the Board of Adjustment hearing in 1996 that Mr.
and Mrs. Collins were utilizing all of their properties as short-term ski rentals. Mr.
Collins testified that he began doing ski rentals in 1994. He further testified that he
owned two properties when he started the ski rental business in 1994 and that he
purchased the other two properties afterward. (R. 350) This testimony was not
controverted. The burden should, therefore, be properly shifted to Sandy City at this
juncture to prove that the Petitioners were not in fact using their properties for shortterm rentals on the date of the Cease and Desist Order in March, 1996. Admittedly,
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this places Sandy City in the somewhat awkward position of alleging that it had no
grounds for issuing that order in the first place.
III.

T H E VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS OF T H E APPELLANTS ARE
SUPERIOR TO RIGHTS CREATED BY T H E SANDY CITY
ZONING ORDINANCES.
Zoning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner's common law right

to unrestricted use of his or her property. Patterson v. Utah County Board ofAdjustment,
893 P. 2d 602, 606 (Utah App. 1995). As previously argued in the Appellant's Brief,
preexisting, lawful uses of property existing prior to zoning ordinances are generally
considered to be vested rights that zoning ordinances may not abrogate. These rights
are grounded in constitutional law. Sandy City argues that the property rights of
other property owners would be adversely affected if this Court were to not impose
the bar of res judicata in this case. This is speculation on the part of Sandy City,
however, and does not provide a valid reason for violating the constitutional rights of
Mr. and Mrs. Collins to continue a valid use of their properties, subject to existing
laws governing their use and maintenance of those properties in the community of
Sandy City.
IV.

T H E SANDY CITY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT ISSUED
ITS DECISION WITH RESPECT TO ALL PROPERTIES
OWNED BY T H E PETITIONERS SITUATED I N SANDY
CITY.
Sandy City alleges in its Brief of Appellees (p. 22) that Appellants have not

identified any evidence in the record showing that the Maison Drive property was
used for short-term rentals at any time. In fact, an examination of the Minutes of the
Board of Adjustment dated August 8, 1996 indicates that the Board of Adjustment
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considered, and listened to testimony respecting, all four properties, including the
property at 9255 South Maison Drive. (R. 348, 351). Testimony was specifically
elicited from residents living on Maison Drive.

(R. 358, 359)

In the 1998

proceedings before the Sandy City Board of Adjustment, testimony was again elicited
from concerned residents, including a resident living on Maison Drive. While Sandy
City is correct that Mr. Paul Harris expressed his opinion that the renters in the house
[on Maison Drive] had longer leases, he also stated that he had noticed an ad placed
by Mr. and Mrs. Collins in a travel magazine advertising the house as a ski rental.
(R. 235) It should be noted that none of the testimony taken in the 1996 or 1998
board of adjustment hearings was under oath or subject to any cross-examination by
the Petitioners' Attorney. No foundation for the testimony was required nor was
relevancy a concern of the Board. The testimony elicited in 1998 was not limited to
facts pertaining to time periods when the properties owned by Mr. and Mrs. Collins
were in fact being used as short-term rentals (prior to March 26, 1996). In fact most,
if not all, of the testimony heard was unrelated to that subject. (R. 232-235)
CONCLUSION
The Petitioners hereby request this Court to reverse the decision of the
District Court granting the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and to
declare that the Petitioners established a valid, non-conforming use with respect to
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their properties owned and held by them, situated in Sandy City, prior to the
enactment of a valid ordinance prohibiting such use, and that such use may continue
until otherwise terminated by law or abandonment by the Petitioners.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of September, 2000.

Franklin L. Slaugh
Attorney for Appellants
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